According to a commentary by the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, political scholar Heribert Dieter from the University of Potsdam argues that Beijing is not the savior of globalization. President Trump's protectionist policies have sparked outrage in EU countries, and some observers suggest that China could be a potential alternative partner.

Prior to the EU-China summit in mid-July, Beijing hopes to promote new cooperative relations. However, the author questions whether expanding economic ties with China is a wise move from Europe’s perspective. He notes that even before Trump's first term began, some executives appeared to view China as the savior of globalization. At the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2017, Xi Jinping was celebrated for his speech supporting a liberal economic order.

Today, this intriguing positive evaluation of China is being repeated. Spanish Prime Minister Sanchez visited Beijing in April and stated that Spain views China as a partner for economic cooperation in Europe. Michael Hüther, director of the German Economic Institute (IW), called for a reconsideration of relationships with China based on a new world economic order that does not rely on the U.S.

Another German economic institute (DIW) director, Marcel Fratzscher, even claimed in May that unlike the U.S., China wants to strengthen multilateral trade order; whereas the U.S. undermines such order due to its protectionism. The author argues that long before the Americans, China had begun undermining the rules-based world trade order, particularly through the extensive use of subsidies that compromise fair competition.

Today, China’s high exports mask the onset of its economic downturn. In 2024, China’s merchandise trade surplus reached a record $992 billion. However, this does not showcase China’s economic strength but rather reflects weak domestic demand. Chinese consumers have lost confidence in the country's continued rise and are responding to a more grim outlook by limiting personal consumption, refraining from purchasing European luxury goods like German cars or French fashion.

Moreover, it is notable that both China and the EU set record merchandise trade surpluses last year. Both are plagued by weak domestic demand and low consumer confidence. Economies with similar issues forming an alliance will not benefit either China or the EU countries.

On the political front, the author questions whether strengthening a geopolitical rival is a smart move. Despite discontent with U.S. policies, Europe still has far more in common with the U.S. than with China. China is neither a market economy, nor can its citizens express dissatisfaction with their government. In 2019, the European Commission explicitly stated that China is a systemic rival promoting an alternative political model. Since then, a closer political alignment between China and Europe has become improbable.

Furthermore, Washington closely monitors Brussels' considerations about rapprochement with China. U.S. Treasury Secretary Mnuchin—one of the calmest strategists of the Trump administration—stated in April that if Europe moves closer to China, it would be like cutting its own throat.